

CONTENTS

April - June 1988

Vol. XXI, no. 2, Issue 99, English Edition

STATE AND CULTURE - I

- NANDY, A. Culture, State and the Rediscovery
of Indian Politics 2
- VACHON, R. Bibliography on "State and Cultures " 18
- DOCUMENT: Committee for Cultural Choices
and Global Futures 24

The past issue (no. 98) was on
"Dominique Temple on Economicide".
The next issue (no. 100) will be on
"Social Work and Cultural Pluralism".

Published in *INTERCULTURE*, French Edition (ISSN 1712-1571)

Cahier 98 (Hiver 1988) "Dominique Temple sur l'économicide",
presenting in French the same texts as
in No. 98, English Edition: "Dominique
Temple on Economicide".

Cahier 99 (Printemps 88) "La culture et l'État", presenting in
French the same texts as in the present
issue, No. 99, English Edition.

published by the monchanin cross-cultural center

ISSN 0828-797X

INTER culture



exploring the frontiers of cross-cultural understanding

* * * 25th Anniversary of the Monchanin Cross-Cultural Center (1963-1988) * * *

State and Culture

I

SPRING/APRIL 1988

99

english edition

an International Research, Information and Exchange Journal

INTERCULTURE is a quarterly founded in Montreal in 1968 by Monchanin Cross-Cultural Center. It has a threefold objective:

- . to inform on contemporary cultures as living realities;
- . to promote research and encounter in full intercultural reciprocity;
- . to explore and raise intercultural questions and issues.

INTERCULTURE reaches anglophone and francophone communities in various parts of the world. It is published in twin editions, one in English, the other in French.

Since it was established, the Monchanin Cross-Cultural Center's journal has passed through three phases:

From Issue no. 1 (January 1968) to Issue no. 71 (April 1981), it bore the title *REVUE MONCHANIN JOURNAL* and contained both English and French texts. With Issue no. 72 (July 1981), it adopted the name of *INTERCULTURE*, but was still bilingual (with occasional issues appearing in separate English and French editions).

Since Issue no. 85 (Winter 1985), *INTERCULTURE* is published in two separate editions, one French (ISSN 0172-1571), the other English (ISSN 0828-797X), both under the same sequence number.

No culture, tradition or community, no matter how evolved, traditional or intercultural it may claim to be, can, by itself, establish the nature of criteria of human growth for the whole of mankind.

INTERCULTURE/English Edition (ISSN 0828-797X). Postage paid Montreal. Second class mail. Registration number 6725. Return postage guaranteed.

Volumes 1-16 (1968-83) available on 35 mm microfilm. Orders to be directed to World Microfilms Publications, 62 Queen's Grove, London NW3 6ER, England.

Indexed with abstracts in *Religion Index One: Periodicals*, American Theological Library Association, 5600 South Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, Illinois 60637.

Published by Monchanin Cross-Cultural Center, 4917 St. Urbain St., Montreal, Quebec, Canada H2T 2W1 (514) 288-7229

* * * PRESENTATION * * *

In this issue no. 99, *INTERCULTURE* has invited a brilliant Hindu scholar, Ashis Nandy, to reflect on the relationship between state and culture in India. He makes two main points.

First, he refuses to accept the modern idea of nation-state as the only genuine version of state and as the very epitome of political maturity. He thus invites us to cease viewing the state as the focal point and ultimate pacesetter of culture, as if culture had to be state-oriented. He refuses to grant primacy to the state and to transform culture into its instrument.

Nandy then submits a radically new notion of the state, where it is culture which becomes the focal point of culture-state relations. The state, then, is no longer the nation-state, but an internal critic, a "thermostat" and an instrument of culture. The state no longer seeks the means through which culture can be made to contribute to the sustenance and growth of the state. Rather, the state here attempts to meet culture's needs for survival and enrichment. Thus, the author opens the way to the rediscovery and recovery of politics which have been usurped by the modern nation-state.

It seems to us that some of Ashis Nandy's proposals are of universal import. They can contribute to a clarification and an in-depth renewal of current thinking regarding culture-state relations in the West - in both Europe and the Americas, including Canada and Quebec.

Besides this text by Ashis Nandy and the presentation of his "Committee for Cultural Choices and Global Futures", *INTERCULTURE* also offers a list of recent works on some of the major themes presently being researched at the Monchanin Cross-Cultural Centre. The Editors.

Culture, State and the Rediscovery of Indian Politics

by ASHIS NANDY

- I -

A society can conceptualize the relationship between its culture and its state in two ways. The first way is to look for the means by which culture can be made to contribute to the sustenance and growth of the state. The state here is seen as operating according to certain fixed, universal, sociological rules. Elements of the culture which help strengthen the state are seen as good; those elements of the culture which do not help the proper functioning of the state or hinder its growth are seen as defective. A mature society, in this view, is expected to shed or actively

eliminate these defective elements so as to improve both the functioning of the state and the quality of the culture.

The second way of looking at the relationship between culture and the state is to do so from the standpoint of the culture. This approach may regard the state as a protector, an internal critic or a thermostat for the culture but not as the ultimate pace-setter for the society's way of life. The state here is made to meet the needs of survival or enrichment of the culture; it is never allowed to

Ashis Nandy is a well-known psychologist and social theorist associated with the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and the Committee for Cultural Choices and Global Futures, Delhi. His publications include *Alternative Sciences* (1980), *At the Edge of Psychology* (1980), *The Intimate Evening* (1983) and *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias* (1987).

dictate terms to the culture. Even when the state is used as a critic of the culture and the culture is sought to be transformed, the final justification for the criticism and the transformation is not sought in the intrinsic logic of statecraft or in the universal laws of state-formation. That justification is sought in the self-perceived needs of the culture and the people, or in the moral framework used by the people.

This dichotomy between the state and the culture-oriented views of society, of course, dissolves if one uses the older idea of the state-as-part-and-parcel-of-culture (as in many traditional societies) or if one refuses to accept the modern idea of nation-state as the only genuine version of state (as is assumed by most modern political and social analysts today). In most non-modern societies, among people who work with the older concept of the state and not with the modern concept of the nation-state, the culture-oriented approach to state is seen as natural and the state-oriented approach as an imposition. (1) Likewise, in modern societies the nation-state-oriented approach seems natural and rational, and the culture-oriented one looks unnatural, irrational or primitive. The choice, therefore, boils down to one between the culture-oriented and the nation-state-oriented. However, for the sake of simplicity, I shall use here the expression state-oriented or statist to mean the nation-state-oriented. (2)

You may notice that I am not taking into account in this dichotomy the nature of the state and the nature of culture. These are vital issues and they need to be discussed fully. For the moment, however, I want to avoid them because I want to be fair to the culture-oriented approach which

believes that a state can destroy the civilisation of which it is a part even when the 'intentions' of the state are 'honourable' and even when it is trying to improve a 'decaying' civilisation. When a state becomes ethnocidal, the culture-oriented approach believes, the remedy does not lie in only capturing the state, since it provides no check against the captured state becoming as ethnocidal in scope as it was before being captured.

- II -

For the last 150 years, westernized, middle-class Indians have learnt to look at the first approach -- the one which orients the needs of the culture to the needs of the state -- as the very epitome of political maturity, achievement and development. Since the nation-state system acquired its present global predominance in the last century, most political analysis in the West, too, has forgotten the other alternative. (3) And since a global science of politics became fully operational after the Second World War, the state-oriented attitude to culture has become the only way of looking at culture the world over. (4) Nearly all studies of political development and political culture done in the fifties and sixties have this cultural engineering component building into them. From Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils and David Easton to Karl Deutsch, Samuel Huntington and Lucian Pye, it is the same story.

This is a part of a larger picture. Take, for instance, the studies of cultural contexts of economic growth done during the same period. The main function of culture, according to these studies, was to facilitate economic growth. Aspects of culture which stood in the way of such

growth had to be ruthlessly excised. In 'stagnant' cultures, that is, in cultures which did not nurture a thriving modern economy, the engineering challenge was to rediscover or introduce cultural elements which would trigger or sustain economic growth and the spirit of the market which went with it. This was the thrust of the psychological studies of achievement motive done by David McClelland and company, and the studies of Protestant-ethics-like elements in non-western cultures by a drove of social anthropologies. Even the hard tough-minded economists of the period, who did not believe in the relevance of such woolly psychological or cultural-anthropological work, never faltered in their belief that a society had to give primacy to the needs of the modern economy, however defined, over the needs of culture. So did the mercenaries among them vending the materialist -- read economic -- interpretation of history to ensure the centrality of their dismal science in the world of social knowledge. In India, at least, I have not come across a single work of any Marxist economist of the period which challenged the basic priority of economics and sought to restore, even as a distant goal, Marx's original vision of a society freed from the bondage of economism. (5)

An exactly similar case can be made about science. Most science-and-culture studies of the fifties and sixties sought to make the society safe for modern science. For this purpose, all non-modern cultures were sought to be retooled and made more rational or modern. Thus, scientific criticisms of culture were encouraged but cultural criticisms of science were dubbed obscurantist. Occasionally shallow criticisms of the social relations of science were allowed --

in the sense that the control over science exercised by imperialism or capitalism or by army generals was allowed to be exposed. But this was done as a part of an attempt to protect the text and the core values of modern science which were seen as absolute and as the last word in human rationality. Here, too, culture was always at the receiving end, while science kept the company of modern political and economic institutions.

We however are talking of politics at the moment, not of the witchcraft called economics or the mega-corporation called modern science. And I want to suggest that in India the primacy granted to the needs of the state -- seen as a necessary part of a ruthless, global, nation-state system -- is not a new idea coined in the late 1940s by the first generation of the post-Independence managers of Indian polity. The primacy of the state was not the discovery of Jawaharlal Nehru or Vallabhbhai Patel, two very different persons who arrived at roughly the same statist ideology through very different personal and intellectual paths. Nor did the primacy-of-the-state theory evolve in the fifties or the sixties when the structural-functional models of political development and positivist-Marxist models of the state endorsed, at two ends of the political spectrum, the primacy of the state. The new model merely re-legitimized what had been brewing for more than a hundred years in India and, perhaps, for more than three hundred years in Europe.

The statist model first came to India in the nineteenth century, in the second phase of colonialism, when a more reactive, self-defensive Hinduism began to take shape in response to the consolidation of social theories which saw colonialism as a civilising

influence and as a pathway from feudalism to modern statehood. (6) It was towards the middle of the nineteenth century that a series of dedicated Hindu religious and social reformers first mooted the idea that what Hinduism lacked was the primacy which most forms of post-medieval, western Christianity granted to the state. Even Islam, they felt, had a built-in space for such primacy. The Hindus did not. That was why, they decided, the Hindus were having it so bad. The sorrow of that generation of reformers was that the Hindu was an animal peculiarly hostile and insensitive to the subtleties of the nation-state system; their hope was that the hostility and insensitivity could be corrected through proper cultural and social engineering. This the religious reformers tried to do through a revision of the Hindu personality and way of life. This effort, because it came as part of a defence of Hinduism, hid the fact that this was the first influential indigenous form of the primacy-of-the-state thesis advanced in India. The thesis, for the first time, brought modern statism within Hinduism, in the sense that the Hindu state of the future was not to be the Hindu polity of the past but a centralized, modern nation-state with a Brahmanic idiom. (7)

The earlier generation of reformers, in what can be called the first phase of British colonialism, had pleaded for greater political participation of Indians and also for greater state intervention in the society. But there were externally imposed limits to their enthusiasm; they did not stress the absolute primacy of the state partly because the state was not theirs and partly because even their British rulers had not yet shown any great ideological commitment to the state system they were running.

The state for the first generation of British rulers was mainly a means of making money, not a means of cultural engineering. These rulers feared and respected Indian culture which they tried not to disturb as long as it did not stand in the way of their greed. (8) Moreover, the raj occupied a relatively small part of the sub-continent and certainly did not give the impression of being the paramount power in the country. The Indians pressuring their British rulers to intervene in Indian society could not internalize a highly activist or an awing grand image of the state.

Nonetheless, the first generation of social reformers had provided the base on which the second generation of reformers built their adoration for the modern idea of the nation-state and their suspicion of all grass-root politics. Certainly, these latter reformers did not put any premium on participatory politics, which they accepted theoretically only as a vague, populist possibility. Even when they spoke of mass politics as desirable, they saw it as something which had to come later -- after the Hindu had been morally and educationally uplifted and after he had learnt to take on modern responsibilities. (9). This shielded them from the awareness that they were unwilling or incapable of mobilizing the ordinary Indians for basic political changes.

These votaries of a Hindu nation-state, thinking that they were pleading for a Hindu polity, were also mostly unaware that the nation-state system was one of the more recent innovations in human civilisation and that it had come into being only about two hundred years earlier in Europe, in the mid-seventeenth century. They chose to see it as one of the eternal verities of humankind. Naturally,

they diagnosed the Hindu inadequacy in state-oriented politics as a result of a major defect in the Hindu personality and culture, which had to be reformed as the first step to political freedom. (The British in India, for their own reasons, endorsed this priority of the cultural over the political enthusiastically.) Many of these social reformers, inappropriately called Hindu revivalists, were to later have much sympathy for the anti-British terrorist movements. But that sympathy did not go with any passion for wider political participation of the masses. Indeed, they were always a little afraid of the majority of Hindus who lived in the 500,000 Indian villages. *Hindurajva*, yes; but not with the full participation of all the *Hindupraja*; at least not with the *praja* as they were, and certainly not with the participation of all Hindus in the short run. The conspiratorial style of the terrorists came handy in this respect since it automatically restricted mass participation. Even the constant invocation of the Hindu past by the revivalists -- the practice which gave them their distinctive name -- was a criticism of the living Hindus. It was a compensatory act. It hid the revivalists' admiration for the West and for middle-eastern Islam, seen as martial and valorous, and it hid the desperate search for the same qualities in the Hindu past. The political consequence of this admiration for the conquerors of the Hindus was the continuous attempt by many to re-educate the 'politically immature', anarchic, living Hindus, so that the latter could rediscover their lost western and Islamic values and play their proper role in the global system of nation-states. Swami Vivekananda, when he envisioned a new race of Vedantic Hindus who would build a western society in India, was only being true to the primacy-of-the-state

thesis. (10)

I am arguing that the nineteenth century characters the modern Indians have learnt to call revivalists were never truly anti-West or anti-Islam. They were only anti-British, and anti-Muslim in the Indian context. Their ideal, in important respects, was western Christianity or middle-eastern Islam. And as for their concept of the state, it was perfectly modern. If anything, they were fundamentally and ferociously anti-Hindu. (11) The only good Hindu to them was the Hindu who was dead, that is, the Hindu who had lived a few thousand years ago. They wanted to enter the world scene with an engineered Hindu who, but for his ideological commitment to classical Hinduism, would be a western man, a man who would accept the rules of the game called the nation-state system and who could not be shortchanged either by the westerner or by the Muslim.

It was this heritage on which both the mainstream liberal and the official Marxist ideologies in India were to later build. Strange though it may sound to many, there was a cultural continuity between the early primacy accorded to the state and the strand of consciousness which was to later seek legitimacy in the popular modern theories of the state in India. Both the liberals and the official Marxists like to link themselves to the earlier integrationist tradition of social reform, the one beginning with Rammohun Roy and more or less ending with Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1940) and Gopal Krishna Gokhale (1866-1915). This ignores the checks within the ideological frame of these pioneers. Rammohun Roy, for instance, was a modernizer but he located the origins of the problems of Hindu personality and culture in the colonial

situation and not in Hindu traditions. He believed that the pathologies of Hinduism he was fighting could be found only around the institutional structures introduced by the British rule and, therefore, his own religious reforms and the new Hindu sect he established were directed only at the exposed Hindus, not at parts of the society untouched by colonialism. In his own crude, unsure way, Roy did try to protect the architechnics of Indian culture. He did not want Indian culture to be integrated into the modern world; he wanted modernity to be integrated into Indian culture. His modern admirers have chosen to forget the checks within him -- weak though the checks were. They have built him up only as the father of modern India and as a mindless admirer of everything western.

Thus, as far as the role of nation-state in the Indian civilisation is concerned, Indian modernists as well as radicals have drawn upon the ideological framework first popularized by Hindu nationalism. It was in their model that the modern nation-state first became an absolute value and acquired absolute primacy over the needs of the Indian civilisation.

- III -

Yet, there has always been in India, during the last 150 years, another intellectual current which has looked at the needs of the society differently. This current sees state-oriented politics as a means of criticizing Indian culture, even as a means of renegotiating traditional social relationships, but it refuses to see such politics as the *raison d'être* of Indian civilisation. However, though a majority of Indians may have always lived with such a concept of politics,

for modern India, the concept has survived only as a part of an intellectual underground since the middle of the nineteenth century.

It was only under the influence of Gandhi (1869-1948) that this current temporarily acquired a certain self-consciousness and political dominance. Gandhi has been often called an anarchist. To the extent he suspected and fought state power and refused to grant it any important role in guiding or controlling political and social change, he was close to anarchism. Also, while leading a freedom struggle against a foreign power, he could get away with his antipathy to the state. But this situation could not last beyond a point. His very success dug the grave of his ideology; his anti-statist political thought quickly went into recession after Independence. The demands of statecraft in a newly Independent nation were such that the national leaders not only began to look with suspicion at the Gandhian emphasis on cultural traditions, they also began to encourage political interpretations of Gandhi which fitted him into the state-oriented frame of politics, neutralizing or ignoring his culture-oriented self as irrelevant saintliness or eccentricity. On this ideological issue, they were in perfect agreement with Gandhi's assassin, Nathuram Godse, an avowed statist. It was not accidental that Godse, though called an ultra-conservative, did not feel threatened by the modernists but by Gandhi. (12)

It is only now that this recessive strain of consciousness is again coming into its own in the works of a number of young and not-so-young scholars -- traditionalists, counter-modernists, post-Maoist Marxists, anarchists and neo-Gandhians. Evident-

ly, an open polity has its own logic. At the peripheries of the modern Indian polity itself, the demand for fuller democratic participation by people who carry the heavy 'burden' of their non-modern culture is becoming an important component of the Indian political idiom.

This consciousness has been endorsed by a political reality having two facets: (1) an increasingly oppressive state-machine which constantly threatens the survival and the ways of life of those Indians it has marginalized and (2) the growing efforts of this marginalized sections to interpret their predicament in terms alien to the modern world and to the state-centred culture of scholarship. (13) I believe that this strain of consciousness will begin to set the pace of the public consciousness in India in the coming decades and the following section is written as a guide and a warning for those pragmatic spirits and hardboiled modernists of both the right and the left who might have to close ranks to fight this new menace to the modern Indian nation-state. Pre-warned after all is pre-armed.

The first element in this odd strain, the strain which views the needs of a civilisation as primary, is the belief that a civilisation must use the state as an instrument and not become an instrument of the state. This of course also means that the Indian state should be reformed before the Indian civilisation is sought to be reformed. This does not argue out cultural reforms or, even, cultural revolutions. But such interventions are not seen from the viewpoint of the needs of the state. The idea that a civilisation can be destroyed or changed beyond recognition reportedly for its own survival in the jungle of

the nation-state system is given up here. At the same time, the culture-oriented approach believes that if there is a need either for a cultural revolution or for modest cultural changes in this society, it should begin in deculturized Anglo-India and then, if necessary, end in its external parts (to translate into English the concept of *bahiskrit samaj* used by Sunil Sahasrabudhey). (14) Culture, in this approach, is the worldview of the oppressed and it must have precedence over the worldview associated with oppressors, even when the latter claims to represent universal, cumulative rationality and sanctions the latest theories of oppression.

Secondly, this approach believes that a culture, in the sense of traditions, represents the accumulated wisdom of the people -- empirical and rational in its architectonics, though not in every detail. It does not automatically become obsolete as a consequence of the growth of modern science or technology. In fact, a complex culture has its own ethnic science and technology which are sought to be destroyed by modern science and technology with the help of state power and in the name of the obsolescence of traditional knowledge systems and life styles. (15)

The non-statists believe that the traditions are under attack today because the people today are under attack. As classical liberalism and czarist Marxism have both by now shown their bankruptcy, many liberals and Marxists have increasingly fallen upon the use of concepts like cultural lag and false consciousness to explain away all resistance to the oppression which comes in the guise of modern science and development. The primacy-of-culture approach fears that more

and more models of social engineering will be generated in the modern sector which would demand from the people greater and greater sacrifices in the name of the state and in the name of state-sponsored development and state-owned science and technology. The culture-oriented approach believes that when the lowest of the low in India are exhorted to shed their 'irrational', 'unscientific', anti-developmental traditions by the official rationalists, the exhortation is a hidden appeal to them to soften their resistance to the oppressive features of the modern political economy in India. (16)

Third, the culture-oriented approach presumes that culture is a dialectic between the classical and the folk, the past and the present, the dead and the living. Modern states, on the other hand, emphasize the classical and the frozen-in-time, so as to 'museumize' culture and to make it harmless. Here, too, the modernists endorse the revivalists who believe in time-travel to the past, the orientalist to whom culture is a distant object of study, and the deculturized to whom culture is what one sees on the stage. Such attitudes to culture go with a devaluation of the folk which is reduced to the artistic and musical self-expression of tribes or language groups. Ethnic arts and ethnic music then become like ethnic food, new indicators of the cultivation of the rich and the powerful. Correspondingly, new areas of expertise open up in the modern sector such as ethnomuseology and ethnomusicology. And cultural anthropology then takes over the responsibility of making this truncated concept of culture communicable in the language of professional anthropology, to give the concept a bogus absolute legitimacy in the name of cultural relativism.

Culture, however, is a way of life and it covers, apart from 'high culture', indigenous knowledge, including indigenous theories of science, education and social change. The defence of culture, according to those who stress cultural survival, is also the defence of these native theories. The defence must challenge the basic hierarchy of cultures, the evolutionist theory of progress, and the historical sense with which the modern mind works. (17) This radical departure from the post-Enlightenment western worldview is something the modern admirers of native cultures can never accept.

Fourth, the culture-oriented approach tries to demystify the traditional reason of the state: national security. It does not deny the importance of national security, even though the statist feel that anyone who is not a statist jeopardizes such security. However, the culture-oriented approach believes that national security can become disjunctive with people's security and may even establish an inverse relationship with the latter. (18) Some of them fear that India is fast becoming a national security state with an ever-expanding definition of security which threatens democratic governance within the country as well as the security of India's neighbours, who are parts of the Indian civilisation. (19)

In addition, the culture-sensitive approach to Indian politics seeks to demystify the two newer reasons of state: conventional development and mainstream science (including technology). It believes that new forces of oppression have been unleashed in Indian society in the name of these new reasons of the state and the new legitimacies they have created. Those for the primacy of culture

believe that these three reasons of state -- security, development and modern science -- are creating internal colonies, new hierarchies and recipient cultures among the people, so that a small elite can live off both economic and psychosocial surpluses extracted from the people as a part of the process of modernization. (20) Modernization, the argument goes, has not fallen into wrong hands; built into it are certain forms of domination and violence. The concept of the expert or the revolutionary vanguard is a part of the same story or, as it looks to the non-moderns, part of the same conspiracy. (21)

It is the feature of the recipient culture sought to be created through the modern state system that the superstitions of the rich and the powerful are given lesser emphasis than the superstitions of the poor and the lowly. This is the inescapable logic of development and scientific rationality today. Only the young, the 'immature' and the powerless are left to attack the superstition of the powerful. (For instance, the belief of the superpowers that national security requires the capacity to kill all living beings of the world thirty times over, as if once was not good enough; the belief of our rulers that every society will one day reach the level of prosperity of the modern West, as if the earth had that kind of resources; or the faith of our science bosses that the expansion of TV or nuclear energy in India would strengthen development without setting up a centralized political control system.) The so-called mature scientists, the ultra-rational liberals and the professional progressives are kept busy attacking superstitions such as astrology because they are small-scale enterprises of the ill-bred, native entrepreneurs, not the trillion-dollar

enterprise which arms trade, cosmetics and pet food industries are. It is a part of the same game to emphasize the unequal economic exchanges between the East and the West and underemphasize the unequal cultural exchanges between the two, which has already made the modern western man the ideal of the official culture of India. The culture-oriented activists believe that the latter form of unequal exchange is more dangerous because it gives legitimacy to the 'proper' dissenters wanting to lead the masses to a utopia which is but an edited version of the modern West. The first step in the creation of this new set of elites for the future is the destruction of the confidence of the people in their own systems of knowledge and ways of life, so that they become recipients both materially and non-materially. (22)

Fifth, the faith in the primacy of culture over the state does not mean the absence of a theory of state. It means another kind of a theory of the state, a theory rooted in the non-modern understanding of modernity and in a worm's-eye view of the imperial structures and categories which go with modernity. It can also be called an outsider's theory of statist politics. (I have already said at the beginning that this approach does give a role to the state as a protector, an internal critic or as a thermostat for the culture.) However, it is an undying superstition of our times that only the modernists can handle the complexities or negotiate the jungle of international politics, ensure internal and external security, maintain national integration and inter-communal peace. It is a part of the superstition to believe that politics is exclusively the politics organised around the state and the prerogative of the self-declared professional politicians. (23)

The theories of the state used by the outsiders - by those who take the cultural approach seriously - differ in important respects from the dominant theories of political modernization. It is the presence of such alternative theories of the outsiders which accounts for the allegations of irrationality or false consciousness made against these outsiders. These alternative theories look bottom upwards towards the modern sector of India and, therefore, they are not palatable to people who rule India or who want to rule it in future after capturing the state from the present rulers. Such non-modern theories of the state have no commitment to the idea of one language, one religion or one culture for India; nor do they think that such linguistic, religious or cultural unification advances the cause of the Indian people. Unlike the modernists and the Hindu-revivalists, those viewing Indian politics from outside the framework of the nation-state system believe it possible for a state to represent a confederation of cultures, including a multiplicity of religions and languages. To each of these cultures, other cultures are an internal opposition rather than an external enemy. Thus, for instance, true to the traditions of Hinduism, many of these outsiders believe that all Indians are definitionally Hindus, crypto-Hindus or Hinduized; they see the modern meaning of the exclusivist concept 'Hindu' as a foreign imposition and as anti-Hindu.

The culture-oriented do have a commitment to India as a single political entity, mainly because it helps the Indian civilisation to resist the suffocating embrace of the global nation-state system and the homogenizing thrust of the culture of the modern West. But they are willing to withdraw the commitment if the statist

forces begin to dismantle the civilisation to make it a proper modern nation-state and a modern culture, that is, if India is sought to be fully de-Indianized for the sake of a powerful Indian nation-state. This does not imply any innocence about the nature of the global system. It indicates a refusal to accept the games the nation-states play and an awareness that the problem of internal colonialism in India is a part of a global structure of dominance.

Sixth, it should be obvious from the foregoing that the cultural approach draws a distinction between political participation and participation in state-oriented politics -- between *lokniti* and *rajniti*, as some following Jai Prakash Narain put it -- and it stresses the former. This is the kind of participation which tries to bring all sections of a society within politics without bringing all aspects of the society within the scope of the state. To those stressing such participation, the politics of the nation-state is only a part of the story and democratization must have priority over system legitimacy. Alas, this also means that the non-statists refuse to see the need for democracy as secondary to the need for a strong state. In recent years, this approach to politics has spawned a vigorous civil rights movement in India which is trying to make democratic participation more real to the lowest of the low. (25)

To the statist, this other kind of political participation is a danger signal. It looks extra-systemic and non-institutionalized -- the kind of participation which the modern political scientist, if brought up on the likes of Samuel Huntington, has learnt to identify as a sure indicator of political decay -- a situation

where political participation outstrips system legitimacy. (26) No wonder, many of those militantly allegiant to the Indian state would prefer to see the peripheries and the bottom of this society either remain apolitical or, in case the latter are already in politics, get systematically depoliticized. (27)

In other words, the culture-oriented approach takes the concept of open society seriously. It knows how the glib talk of culture often hides third world despotism. Indeed, the approach takes the principles of democratic governance to their logical conclusion by refusing to accept the definition of civic culture vended by the usurpers or controllers of the state. Culture, this approach affirms, lies primarily with the people. Next door in Pakistan, the dumb general with the toothy smile can find no consolation in the new culturist point of view which is emerging in many traditional societies and, particularly, in this sub-continent. Nor can the senile Ayatollah of Iran in his new incarnation as an Islamic Dracula. Their Islam is a state-controlled set of slogans and gimmicks; it has little to do with Islamic culture, for such a culture can be identified only through open democratic processes. Hopefully, a culture-sensitive polity in India will not stop at mechanical electoral representation of atomized individuals or secularized classes; it will extend representation also to the myriad ways of life in the hope that in the twenty-first century Indian democracy will reflect something of the uniqueness of this civilisation, too, and pursue the principle of freedom with dignity as a basic human need.

- IV -

Finally, I must borrow two terms from contemporary philosophy of science to explain the 'link' between the world view which swears by the primacy of the state and the one which swears by the primacy of culture. The former thinks it has an explanation of the latter, which it sees as a product of the frustrations of those who have been displaced from their traditional moorings by the forces of modernity. More, not less, modernity is seen as the antidote for the insane, anti-scientific world view of the disgruntled, culture-drunk, uprooted non-moderns. This is the tired crisis-of-change thesis. The later world view believes that alternative paradigms of knowledge -- whether they come from updated Indian traditions or from some powerful post-modern theories of the state -- cannot be legitimized by categories generated by the presently dominant paradigms of political analysis. There is fundamental and irreconcilable incommunicability between the two sets of paradigms. This is one instance, this world view claims, where no genuine common language or dialogue is possible. However, the non-moderns do believe that it is possible for parts of the modern vision to survive in another incarnation, as a subset of a post-modern, and simultaneously more authentically Indian vision -- somewhat in the way the Newtonian world view survives in the Einsteinian world. With the growing cultural self-confidence of the Indian intellectuals and informed activists, it is possible that the modern West will be seen by a growing number of future Indians the way Gandhi used to see it; as a part of a larger native frame -- valuable in many ways, but also dangerous by virtue of its ability to become cancerous.

It is known that when the Newtonian world view is sought to be explained in Einsteinian terms, elements of it, such as mass and velocity, retard rather than facilitate communication. This is because the concepts common to the two world views are rooted in different theories and, thus, have different meanings. (This of course is the well-known meaning-variation argument in post-Popperian philosophy of science.) In the context of the issues we are discussing, this means that concepts such as rationality, empirical data, mathematization and experimental verification provide no bridge between the state-oriented and the culture-oriented world views. Nor do concepts like history, culture, injustice, patriotism or dissent. No sentiment-laden lecture by the national-security chap on how much he loves his culture is going to appease the activist working among the tribals to protect their lifestyle; nor will the copious tears shed by the ultramodern, rationalist scientist for the Indian village will move the person to whom the superstitions of the rich (such as the billion-dollar con-games involving anti-diarrhoeal drugs or the so-called health-food products like Horlicks and Bourneville) are more dangerous than the pathetic antics of the small-time pavement palmist, being pursued by the

urbane rationalists for conning someone out of a couple of rupees (somewhat in the manner in which the village lunatics are pursued by stone-throwing teenagers while greater lunatics are allowed to become national leaders or war heroes). If you speak to the culture-oriented Indian about the superstitions of the witch doctors or *mantravadis*, he will shrug his shoulders and walk away; he is more concerned about the irrational search for permanent youth which makes the annual cosmetics bill of American women outstrip the combined annual budgets of all the African countries put together; he is more worried about the superstitious fear of being left behind by other nations which prompts the Indian Sixth Plan to invest more than Rs. 900 crore in only the R&D for space and nuclear programmes when the corresponding figure for the R&D for education is 1.2. (28) The two sides -- the statist and the culturists -- speak entirely different languages.

It is the unmanageable crisis of one world view -- in this case that of the nation-state-oriented modernity -- which has prompted some to switch sides. Call this defection another kind of political realism or call it an act of faith. I like to call it the latter; after all, faith does move mountains.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

- (1) In traditional India, for instance, the state was clearly expected to be a part of culture and the king was expected to see himself not only as a protector of *dharma* but also as a protector of multiple ways of life and a promoter of ethnic tolerance. The *Arthashastra* may not provide a clue to this but the *puranas*, the folklores and *lokachar* do.
- (2) It must be obvious that the word 'statist' does not have, in this context, the meaning it generally has in debates between the socialist thinkers and the liberals believing in a minimal state.

- (3) So much so that when confronted with the hard reality of a culture-oriented approach to the state, as in the case of a Gandhi or a Khomeini, the modern political analysts and journalists are forced to fall back on state-oriented analytic categories, even after the categories have shown poor interpretive power.
- (4) One of the first Marxist thinkers in the third world to explicitly recognize the primacy of culture was Amílcar Cabral (1924-1974). See his *Return to the Source : Selected Speeches* (New York, Monthly Review Press, 1973). He, of course, drew upon the work of Aimé Césaire and Léopold Senghor. One suspects that the African heritage of all three had something to do with this sensitivity. The disintegrating native cultures they saw around them were more threatened than threatening, something which a Mao Zedong could not say about China. In India, unfortunately, even the Marxism of classical scholars like D. D. Kosambi and D. P. Chattopadhyay have remained in essence another version of western orientalism and colonial anthropology.
- (5) For a discussion of the political consciousness which characterized this phase of colonial politics, and its persistence within the culture of Indian politics as an important strain, see my "The Making and Unmaking of Political Cultures of India", *At the Edge of Psychology : Essays in Politics and Culture* (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 47-69.
- (6) Probably Bankimchandra Chatterjee (1838-1894) was the first well-known theoretician of the state-oriented approach in India. I say 'probably' because he stated his position indirectly, often through his literary and theological works or through commentaries on the works of others. Sudipta Kaviraj suggests that Bhudev Mukhopadhyaya (1827-1894), a lesser-known contemporary of Bankimchandra, was the first to explicitly accept and plead for a modern nation-state in India.
- (7) See my "The Making and Unmaking of Political Cultures in India". The limits were partly internal, too. For instance, the ambivalence of Rammohun Roy (1772-1833), who aggressively worked for the abolition of the practice of *sati* but also doubted the wisdom of a state-imposed ban on *sati*.
- (8) Aurobindo Ghose (1872-1950) in his revolutionary years was a good example of such romantic populism. The revolutionary hero of Sarat Chandra Chatterji's novel *Pather Dabi*, Sabyasachi, is a faithful idealization of this attitude to political participation.
- (9) It was the same vision of India which explains Sister Nivedita's (1867-1911) discomfort with Ananda Coomaraswamy (1877-1947) whom she considered too conservative.
- (10) This has been discussed in Ashis Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy : Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1983).
- (11) For example, Rammohan Roy, "Additional Queries Respecting the Condition of India", in Kalidas Nag and Debajyoti Burman (eds.), *The English Works* (Cal-

cutta, Sadhoran Brahmo Samaj, 1947), Part III, pp. 63-8, see pp. 64-5:

From a careful survey and observation of the people and inhabitants of various parts of the country, and in every condition of life, I am of opinion that the peasants and villagers who reside at a distance from large towns and head stations and courts of law, are as innocent, temperate and moral in their conduct as the people of any country whatsoever; and the further I proceed towards the North and West (i.e., away from British India: A.N.), the greater the honesty, simplicity and independence of character I meet with.

- (12) Ashis Nandy, "Final Encounter : The Politics of the Assassination of Gandhi", *At the Edge of Psychology*, pp. 70-98; and "Godse Killed Gandhi?", *Resurgence*, January-February 1983 (96), pp. 28-9.
- (13) It is the attempt to grapple with this reality which has revived Gandhian social theory in India, mostly among people who reject orthodox Gandhism. The revival has as little to do with the personal life and the personal successes or failures of Gandhi as Marx's life and his successes and failures have to do with Marxist thought today. The modern Indians naturally like to give the credit for this revival to either 'Hindu woollyheadedness' or to the false consciousness generated by 'romantic propagandists' like Richard Attenborough.
- (14) Sunil Sahasrabudhe, "Towards a New Theory", *Seminar*, May 1982 (273), pp. 19-23; and "On Alien Political Categories", *Gandhi Marg*, February 1983, 4 (11), pp. 896-901. Sahasrabudhe is one of the few serious Marxists in India who have self-consciously built into their models indigenous cultural categories.
- (15) In the context of Indian traditions of science and technology, this point has been made indirectly and painstakingly by Dharampal, *Indian Science and Technology in the Eighteenth Century : Some Contemporary European Accounts* (New Delhi, Impex India, 1971); and directly and passionately by Claude Alvares, *Homo Faber : Technology and Culture in India, China and West, 1500 to the Present Day* (New Delhi : Allied, 1979). See also Claude Alvares, "Science, Colonialism and Violence", Shiv Visvanathan, "The Annals of a Laboratory State", and Vandana Shiva, "Reductionist Science as Epistemic Violence", in Ashis Nandy (ed.), *Science, Hegemony and Violence* (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
- (16) On development, as it is seen by the wretched of the earth from outside the modern world view, two of the clearest statements are Claude Alvares, "Deadly Development", *Development Forum*, 9 (7), October 1983; Special Issue on Survival, *Lokayan Bulletin*, 1985, 3 (4-5); Madhya Pradesh Lokayan and Lokhit Samiti, Singrauli, *Vikas ki Kimat* (Ahmedabad, Setu, 1985); and see also Ashis Nandy, "The Idea of Development : The Experience of Modern Psychology as a Cautionary Tale and as an Allegory", in Carlos Mallmann and Oscar Nudler (eds.), *Human Development in its Social Context* (London,

Hodder and Stoughton and U.N. University, 1986), pp. 248-260; "Development and Authoritarianism : An Epitaph of Social Engineering", *Lokayan Bulletin*, 1987, 5 (1), pp. 38-48; and "Culture, Voice and Development", in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.), *The Changing Structure of World Politics* (Tokyo, Iwanami Shoten, in press).

- (17) In the Indian context such a point of view was aggressively advanced by Gandhi. See the pioneering essay of A. K. Saran, "Gandhi and the Concept of Politics", *Gandhi Marg*, 1980, 1 (1), pp. 675-726. Also Thomas Pantham, "Thinking with Mahatma Gandhi : Beyond Liberal Democracy", *Political Theory*, 1983, 2 (2), pp. 165-188; and Ashis Nandy, "From Outside the Imperium : Gandhi's Cultural Critique of the 'West'", in *Traditions, Tyranny and Utopias : Essays in the Politics of Awareness* (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 127-162.
- (18) For instance, Giri Deshingkar, "Civilisational Concerns", *Seminar*, December 1980, (256), pp. 12-17; and "People's Security Versus National Security", *Seminar*, December 1982, (280), pp. 28-30.
- (19) This point has been sharply made by Bharat Wariavwallah, "Indira's India : A National Security State?", *Round Table*, July 1983, pp. 274-285; and "Personality, Domestic Political Institutions and Foreign Policy", Ram Joshi (ed.), volume to be published on the occasion of 100 years of Indian National Congress, forthcoming. Also, Deshingkar, "National Security Versus People's Security".
- (20) For some culture-sensitive Indian intellectuals, the definition of conventional development given by Afsaneh Eghbal ("L'Etat contre l'ethnicité - Une nouvelle arme : le 'Développement Exclusion'", *IFDA Dossier*, July-August 1983, (36), pp. 17-29) in the context of Africa, is the only valid one:

Development is a structure in which a centralised power, in the form of a young sovereign state, formally negotiates international funds for rural populations representing ethnicity ... no external aid, in the field of development, can relate directly to ethnic groups caught in the problematique of survival. All aid is first absorbed and often plundered by state power.

The Indian critic of development will however further generalize the principle and affirm that it holds for internal resources, too. Good descriptions of the process of development in India from this point of view are in Alvares, "Deadly Development". For a theoretically alert description of the political context within which such developmental pathologies emerge, see Rajni Kothari, "The Crisis of the Moderate State and the Decline of Democracy", in Peter Lyon and James Manor (eds.), *Transfer and Transformation : Political Institutions in the New Commonwealth* (Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1983), pp. 29-47.

- (21) A proper critique of the rhetoric of revolution has not yet developed in India. Revolution could be considered in certain contexts, a reason of a

shadow state, the state which would come into being after the present one will have been captured by middle-class, urbane, modern revolutionaries. The sacrifices which revolutionaries demand subserve, therefore, the class interests of the shadow rulers of a shadow state. However, a critique of statism and a non-modern awareness of culture has just begun to take shape at the peripheries of the Marxist movements in India. See for instance some of the works of the Patriotic and People Oriented Science and Technology group, published in the various issues of the *PPST Bulletin*.

- (22) Ashis Nandy, "A Counter-Statement on Humanistic Temper", *Mainstream*, October 19, 1981, and *Deccan Herald*, October 18, 1981.
- (23) I must again emphasize that the culture-oriented approach to the state stands for greater democratic participation and, thus, for more politics, not less. It wants to pursue the logic of an open polity to its end, to widen the compass of democratic politics. On the other hand, state-oriented politics, in societies where there are living non-modern traditions, have often shown the tendency to throttle democratic institutions the moment participation by the underprivileged crosses a certain threshold.

I should also emphasize that non-statist politics is not the same as non-party politics. However, the two can sometimes overlap. The new interest in non-party politics is not the same which inspired some of the earlier writers on the subject such as M. N. Roy and J. P. Narayan. The new interest, however, builds upon the old. For a sample of recent writings on the non-party political processes in India, see D. L. Sheth, "Grass-Roots Stirrings and the Future of Politics", *Alternatives*, 1983 9 (1), pp. 1-24; and some of the papers in Harsh Sethi and Smitu Kothari (eds.), *The Non-Party Political Process : Uncertain Alternatives* (Delhi : UNRISD and Lokayan, 1983), pp. 18-46, mimeographed. On the issue of culture and authoritarianism in India, particularly on how authoritarianism often rears its head in such societies as a part of the effort to contain the non-modern political cultures of the peripheries: "Adorno in India : Revisiting the Psychology of Fascism", *At the Edge of Psychology*, pp. 99-111; and "Political Consciousness", *Seminar*, 1980 (248), pp. 18-21.
- (25) See the various issues of the *PUCI Bulletin* for an idea of the scope and concerns of various such groups, the best-known of which are, of course, the People's Union of Civil Liberties, People's Union of Democratic Rights and the Citizens for Democracy.
- (26) Evidently, liberal democracy in a multi-ethnic society has built-in limits on its own commitment to democracy. See Kothari, "The Crisis of the Moderate State and the Decline of Democracy".
- (27) Such depoliticization may come through increasing criminalization of politics or from apathy structured by the failure of political opposition to tackle basic social problems. Both can be found in India today.
- (28) Dharendra Sharma, *India's Nuclear Estate* (New Delhi, Lancers, 1983), p. 141.

State and Cultures

by ROBERT VACHON

Les livres et manuscrits présentés dans cette bibliographie peuvent être consultés à la bibliothèque du Centre Interculturel Monchanin.

Native America

Abensour, M., dir., Michel Deguy et al. *L'esprit des lois sauvages. Pierre Clastres* ou une nouvelle anthropologie politique*. Paris : Seuil, 1987. 216 p.

1. Prestige de l'ethnographie, pp. 19-40
2. L'inversion de la dette (propos sur les royautes sacrées africaines), pp. 41-60
3. Quelques réflexions épistémologiques préliminaires sur le concept de sociétés contre l'Etat, pp. 61-72
4. La passion de Pierre Clastres, pp. 73-94
5. La guerre et l'Etat primitif, pp. 95-114
6. Le *Contre Hobbes* de Pierre Clastres, pp. 115-144
7. Du silence au dialogue : la fin des tribus, pp. 145-154
8. Notes sur l'un, le deux et le multiple, pp. 155-172
9. Le Malencontre de La Boétie et les théories de l'Inde ancienne sur la nature de la société, pp. 173-182
10. L'oeuvre de Clastres, pp. 183-209

* Pierre Clastres (1934-1977) is a French ethnologist of École des hautes études who made his fieldwork notably among the Guayaki, Guarani and Chulupi native people in Paraguay, as well as among the Yanomami Indians in Venezuela.

Smallface Marule, Marie. "An Indian Perspective on Canadian Politics", in Fox, White, *Politics : Canada*. 6th ed. Toronto : Mc Graw-Hill, 1987. pp. 26-33.

Vachon, Robert. *The Future of Native Indian Self-Government*. Ms. 1987.

Wahrhaftig, Albert. *We Who Act Right : The Persistent Identity of Cherokee Indians*. Ms. 1987.

Wahrhaftig, A. and Robert K. Thomas. "Renaissance and Repression : The Oklahoma Cherokee", *Transaction*, Feb. 1969, pp. 42-48.

Asia

"The Emerging Peace Process and the Ethnic Question in Sri Lanka", *Logos*, vol. 25, no. 3 (Oct. 1986). Colombo : Centre for Society and Religion.

Radhika Coomaraswamy, "The Proposals - Towards a Consensus?", pp. 1-18.

A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, "Sri Lanka's Draft Framework for Devolution", pp. 19-24.

C. Viswasam, "Some Peripheral Aspect of Devolution", pp. 25-30.

P. Devarajah, "Another Look at Devolution", pp. 31-40.

Charles Abeysekera, "The Statement Issued on Behalf of MIRJE", pp. 41-48.

Chandrika Kumaratunga, "Peace : For What?", pp. 49-57.

Jagath Senaratne, "An Ethnic Compact Towards Ethnic Co-existence", pp. 58-65.

Mervyn De Silva, "Peace Process : The Opportunities and Risks", pp. 60-74.

The Revd. Celestine Fernando, "In the Service of a United Sri Lanka", pp. 75-98.

Devadoss, T. S. *Sarvodaya* and the Problem of Political Sovereignty*. Madras : University of Madras, 1974. 651 p.

I. Spiritual Basis of *Sarvodaya*

1. Introduction : Doctrine, Forerunners, Influences...
2. Ethical Principles and Discipline
3. Social and Economic Orders of *Sarvodaya*

II. Political Order of *Sarvodaya* and the Problem of Political Sovereignty

4. Analytical Exposition of the Theories of the State, Its Purpose and End in Indian and Western Political Thought.
5. The Concept of Sovereignty in Indian and Western Political Thought
6. *Sarvodaya* and the Problem of Political Sovereignty

* *Sarvodaya* : concept of Hindu tradition (literally "allaround well-being of all") basic to Gandhian thought.

Moltman, J. "In search for Equilibrium of Equilibrium and 'Progress'", *Ching Feng*, 30 : 1-2, pp. 5-18.

Nandy, Ashis. *The Ideology of the State and the Changing Language of Indian Politics*. Ms. 1984.

Nandy, Ashis. *The Intimate Enemy : Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism*. Delhi, Bombay, Calcutta : Madras, Oxford University Press, 1983, 121 p.

- I. The Psychology of Colonialism : Sex, Age and Ideology in British India
- II. The Uncolonized Mind : A Post-Colonial View of India and the West.

Nandy, Ashis. *The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance*. Ms. 1987.

Nandy, Ashis. *Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias : Essays in the Politics of Awareness*. Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1987. xx, 168 p.

1. Evaluating Utopias : Considerations for a Dialogue of Cultures and Faiths
2. Towards a Third World Utopia
3. Reconstructing Childhood : A Critique of the Ideology of Adulthood
4. The Traditions of Technology
5. Science, Authoritarianism and Culture : On the Scope and Limits of Isolation Outside the Clinic
6. From Outside the Imperium : Gandhi's Cultural Critique of the West

Pye, Lucian W. and Mary W. Page. *Asian Power and Politics : The Cultural Dimensions of Authority*. Cambridge, Mass., London, England : The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985. xiii, 414 p.

- I. Asia and Theories of Development
- II. The Evolution of Asian Concepts of Power
- III. East Asia : Varieties of Confucian Authority
- IV. Southeast Asia : From God-Kings to the Power of Personal Connections
- V. The South Asian Subcontinent : Hindu and Muslim Power and the Rewards of Narcissism
- VI. The Riddle of Japan : The Combining of Competition and Consensus
- VII. China : The Illusion of Omnipotence
- VIII. Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam : Forms of Aggressive Confucianism
- IX. Malaysia : Confrontation of Two Incompatible Cultures
- X. Islamic Power : The Pulls of Reformism and Fundamentalism
- XI. The Substance of Asian Power : Formal Structures and Informal Relations
- XII. Paternalistic Authority and the Triumph of Dependency

Sivaraksa, Sulak. *Siamese Resurgence : A Thai Buddhist Voice on Asia and a World of Change*. Bangkok : Asian Cultural Forum on Development, 1985. 463 p., ill.

Black Africa

Le Roy, Etienne. "Introduction du modèle européen de l'Etat en Afrique francophone", dans *Décolonisation et nouvelles dépendances*. Paris : Presses universitaires de Lille, 1986. 283 p.

Savonnet-Guyot, Claudette. *Etat et sociétés au Burkina. Essai sur le politique africain*. Paris : Ed. Karthala, 1986. 227 p.

I. Au coeur des sociétés, l'inventaire du politique

1. Un exemple d'espace: le Yir birifor
2. L'espace politique villageois
3. Une société pour l'Etat : guerriers et paysans des royaumes Moose
4. Archéologie sociale et géographie politique

II. Genèse et destin de l'Etat

1. La difficile genèse de l'Etat-Nation
2. La dérive démocratique : 25 années d'instabilité institutionnelle et politique
3. Le temps des prétoriens

Conclusion : Les paysanneries et l'Etat

Middle East

Arkoun, Mohammed. *L'Islam morale et politique*. Paris : Desclée de Brouwer, 1986. 239 pp.

I. Axiologie coranique

II. Dîn, Dawla, Dunyâ

III. Visions éthiques et sens pratique

IV. Visions politiques et histoire concrète

Conclusion : L'Islam aujourd'hui

Annexe : *Dialogue sur l'Islam et l'Etat*. Colloque de l'UNESCO, 7-10 déc. 1982.

I. Fonction de l'Etat suivant la théorie islamique

II. L'Etat et l'individu dans la société islamique

III. L'Islam à l'époque de la colonisation et des nationalismes

Conclusion : La crise actuelle de l'Etat et l'Islam

Basmadjian, Varvara. *Les Arméniens : réveil ou fin*. Paris : Editions Entente, 1979. 167 p.

- I. Le passé
 1. Formation d'un peuple
 2. L'Arménie chrétienne
 3. Identité culturelle
 4. Le Royaume de Cilicie
 5. Une nation sans Etat

- II. La dispersion
 6. L'Arménie soviétique
 7. Les Arméniens dans le monde
 8. France : la soif d'arménité

Ben Nefissa-Paris, S. "Discours islamiques, l'Etat et le droit : le cas Tunisien", *Bulletin de Liaison*, no 19 (fév. 1986), pp. 43-80. Laboratoire d'anthropologie juridique de Paris, Université de Paris I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, Association Anthropologie et juridique.

Résume une thèse remarquable et originale sur les relations entre l'Islam, l'Etat-Nation et les pays arabes. On en trouvera un rapport critique chez:

Alliot, Michel, Yadh Ben Achour, Etienne Le Roy. "Rapport sur la thèse de doctorat en Droit présentée par Madame Sarah Ben Néfissa épouse Paris sur *Islam, autorité et Etat: l'exemple tunisien*, le 13 janvier 1986", *Bulletin de liaison*, no 10 (fév. 1986), pp. 37-42. Laboratoire d'anthropologie juridique de Paris, Université de Paris-I - Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, Association Anthropologie et juridique.

West

Barelli, Yves, J.-F. Boudy et J.-F. Caranco. *L'espérance occitane*. Préface de Robert Escarpit. Paris : Editions Entente, 1980. 151 p.

1. Occitan, richesse et réalité
2. L'Etat et l'Occitan, hier et aujourd'hui
3. Pour une nouvelle politique. Identités culturelles et communauté nationale
4. Quatre actions prioritaires:
 - L'Occitan à l'école
 - L'Occitan dans les media
 - L'Occitan dans la production culturelle
 - L'Occitan dans la vie publique

Eghbal, Afsaneh. "L'Etat contre l'ethnicité. Une nouvelle arme : le développement-exclusion", *IFDA* (juillet-août 1983), pp. 17-29.

Giordano, Christian. *Ethnicité et représentations de l'Etat en Italie du Sud*. Ms. Frankfurt : Institut für Kulturanthropologie und Europäische

Ethnologie Universität Frankfurt, s.d.

Gross, D. "Temporality and the Modern State", *Theory and Society*, vol. 14, no. 1 (Jan. 1985), pp. 53-82.

Comment l'Etat moderne a transformé notre conception du temps et de la temporalité pour satisfaire son idéologie.

Markale, Jean. *Identité de Bretagne*. Paris : Editions Entente, 1985. 214 p.

- I. L'histoire
- II. La société bretonne
- III. L'identité bretonne

Morisset, Jean. *L'identité usurpée, T. I, L'Amérique écartée*. Montréal : Nouvelle optique, 1985. 164 p. (à venir: T. II, *La rédemption nordique*, et T. III, *La fabrication du Québec*)

Introduction. Vers l'émergence de la réalité canadienne
 I. Identité américaine et identité canadienne
 II. Québec nouveau et gestion des vaincus

Oyhamburu, Philippe. *L'irréductible phénomène basque*. Paris : Editions Entente, 1980. 159 p.

1. Les premiers 30,000 ans
2. De Strabon à Zumalakarregi
3. Les débuts du nationalisme basque
4. La guerre d'Euzkadi
5. Biltzen, Berotzen, Bozten : l'orgueil d'être Basque
6. La langue revendiquée : l'euskara
7. Autogestion et touristiculture
8. Le pays basque et la liberté. Eta V et VI

Petrella, R. *La Renaissance des cultures régionales en Europe*. Paris : Editions Entente, 1978. 317 p.

Stavenghagen, R. "Droits de l'homme et droits des peuples. La question des minorités", dans *L'Université est-elle menacée?* New York : Nations-Unies, 1987, pp. 67-89.

Vachon, Robert. *L'identité nationale non-étatique*. Ms. Montréal : Centre interculturel Monchanin, 1988.

Committee for Cultural Choices and Global Futures

The Committee for Cultural Choices and Global Futures was established in 1983 by a group of scholars in quest of a more holistic, politically sensitive, social knowledge. The group is guided by the belief that all knowledge is political intervention and that the responsibility for such intervention must be shared by the co-creators and transmitters of knowledge, that is, the intellectuals.

The activities of the Committee are informed by three basic concerns: an intellectual concern for the ecology of plural knowledge, a normative concern with cultural survival, and a political concern with the search for humane futures for the 'victims of history'. Underlying these ideas is the belief that every representation of truth constitutes a vital but partial embodiment of truth, that truth as such is always a mystery which may never be fully unravelled, and that every representation of truth is a time-and-space-bound social construction open to critical scrutiny.

The intellectual framework of the Committee's programme, as it has developed till now, includes the following components:

I. The Committee believes that the world of knowledge today is structured by a confrontation between a dominant, unifying discourse and a set of subjugated, marginalised ones. The dominant 'official' discourse is secular, scientific, managerial and nation-state based. Its melting pot models and assimilationist

THE COMMITTEE FOR CULTURAL CHOICES AND GLOBAL FUTURES (1987)

Members: Imtiaz Ahmed, Veena Das, Giri Deshingkar, Rajni Kothari, Ashis Nandy, *Chairman*, D.L. Sheth, Shiv Visvanathan, *Convener*;

Associated Scholars: Claude Alvares, J.K. Bajaj, Shobha Raghuram, Ravi Rajan, Tejinder Walia, *Programme Associate*;

Address: Exchange Building, First Floor, 13 Alipur Road, Delhi 110054, Telephone: 2523930; *Registered Office:* A43E DDA Colony, Munirka, New Delhi 110067.

modes have created a standardised cultural mould, expressed in the modern culture already dominant in many societies. Thus, there is the official India of the textbook histories, theories of progress and secular statecraft, mirroring the middle-class search for western levels of consumption, technological fixes and national power. It is the India of socialism, secularism and modernisation. It is, all said, an India produced by nineteenth-century Europe. For all their differences, this India and the modern West are tied together by the same discourse on development and progress, committed to the same process of industrialisation, scientific growth and secularisation.

The discourse, and the logic of labelling it uses, automatically specify the officially permissible pathologies. For the affluent industrialised West, the problems are militarisation (especially the nuclear arms race), consumerism, alienation, hyper-individualism, racism, male chauvinism, ecological devastation, and the racially-tinged violence of the kind displayed in the two world wars, and in Algeria, Vietnam and Cambodia. For official India these are but the inevitable diseases in the career of an evolving secular nation-state, committed to industrialisation. The official directory of diseases in India would also include communalism, (1) over-population, epidemics, poverty and inequality. The two officialdoms, those of India and the West, are tied together in the technocratic vision of their migratory consultants.

The scholars in the Committee do not deny the importance of these problems, but they insist on viewing the problems critically and in a larger context. They believe that as a model, modernity has been monolithic and cognitively coercive. They believe that as a concept, the Enlightenment idea of progress has lost much of its creative potential, and it must now be brought into a pluralistic encounter with the possibilities it has suppressed.

II. The Committee, being concerned primarily with the politics of knowledge and with knowledge as power, believes that the universities the world over now represent the cultural dominance of the West as shown by the relationship between various forms of knowledge within them. In the university, science dominates personal knowledge, formal theory dominates empirical knowledge, the secular dominates the theological, and the national dominates the ethnic. The boundaries between the departments of an university are rigid and more sacrosanct than any political frontier. The university, symbolising the official classification of knowledge, also excludes or marginalises many systems close to the people which offer the hope of serving as vantage grounds for new forms of knowledge.

Within the domain of medicine for instance, in much of the

third world, the normal medical institutions represent the dominant western medical system. The unani and ayurvedic systems (2) do survive in India, but as secondary structures in small niches within the system. Likewise, the craftsman has no place in the research laboratory and a potter, blacksmith or a farmer is an object of training and not a person of knowledge *sui generis*. Nor have the elaborate networks of folk and craft knowledge any intrinsic legitimacy in the officialdom of knowledge. As a result, the conventional university has increasingly throttled the possibility of an encounter between the politics of knowledge within the academic world and the politics of knowledge outside.

Throughout the history of the university, however, dissenting academics have criticised and subverted the existing systems of knowledge and catalysed new conceptions of truth. There have been, for instance, small groups which have fissioned off from the university, worked creatively on their own, and sometimes even merged back into the formal scholarly community to continue as part of an ongoing tradition. The creativeness of this complementarity, often broken in the third-world societies, needs to be restored. No educational system, not even the most conventional one, is complete without its dissenting academics.

The Committee sees itself as a group of scholars from universities and research institutions seeking to initiate a dialogue and cross-pollination among the different orders of peripheralised knowledge and as an umbrella for younger researchers within or outside the academe, willing to self-consciously use alternative systems of knowledge as a mode of social criticism and political intervention.

III. As a collective of intellectuals confronting the modern West within the non-western world, the Committee seeks to explore forms of social knowledge outside the world view of development, modern science, and the nation-state system. The Committee believes that the vocabulary of the modern world carries with it a metaphysical underworld -- words, emotions, concepts, worlds which could be seen and worlds which are disallowed. That is, the very use of certain concepts implies a set of actions logically flowing from the concepts and the very anticipation or engineering of a particular world involves the simultaneous denial of others.

For instance, nationalism as an ideal and as a historical force has sought and powered the creation of modern politics in many societies. The careers of Mazzini, Ataturk or Nehru have embodied for many third-world scholars nationalist politics and its poiesis. Yet, one must today confront the fact that nationalism has hidden, suppressed or distorted other living realities. Nationalism has tended to absorb, eliminate or bastardise ethnicities. It has condemned as parochial or local the ontologies of

tribes, folk religions, and regions. Nationalism does not even consider the cultural logic of these entities as they constitute their own valid identities. For the various forms of nationalist thought, these entities represent communalism, (3) not *communitas*.

The monolithic nature of such a vocabulary becomes even more obvious in science. If the nation-state is the privileged form of political order, science is the privileged form of truth. The slogan of scientific spirit is not a call for a liberated form of thinking but a tutelary statement disallowing the exploration of other possibilities. For modern science not merely seeks to hegemonise truth, it seeks to suppress its own roots of creativity -- separating Newton the alchemist from Newton the physicist, Goethe the poet from Goethe the scientist, and Srinivasa Ramanujan (4) the mathematician from both his native culture and the traditions of India mathematics.

The Committee hopes to recover a part of these suppressed archives, as an experiment in articulation of a more holistic truth, and as an 'anti-history' of official India and the West. It is the responsibility of the third-world intelligentsia, the Committee believes, to recognise that the third world needs to protect not merely its own values but also the values of other cultures similarly marginalised in the West itself. For together the two sets of marginalised values constitute a global cultural repertoire for future generations.

In other words, the Committee accepts the argument that the third world has to be a 'guardian of memory' -- of both what the West has sacrificed within its own self and what it has annihilated in other cultures through its imperial expansion. The two processes are linked; for the West could overpower others only by sacrificing a part of the western culture itself. One hundred years ago, M. L. Sircar, while establishing the first modern science laboratory in India, wrote that India might have to rescue science from the western civilisation. And Gandhi always hoped to liberate Christianity from the modern West. The Committee for Cultural Choices and Global Futures hopes to sustain and build upon this awareness through a continuing exegesis of the West.

IV. As part of this exercise, the Committee plans to take a critical look at one other key word in the philosophical dictionary of modernity, secularism. The scholars associated with the Committee believe that it is possible to avoid both theocratic models of politics as well as the mechanical separation of religion and the state. They believe that new kinds of political creativity can be unleashed through encounters between politics and religion, in cultures which are organised around religions and in societies where religions have served as a form of resistance to

the deculturation and desacralisation brought about by capitalism, imperialism and the mass society. The Committee rejects the emptiness of secularism, as a source of de-ethnicisation and as a contributory factor in the rise of contemporary fundamentalism and ethnic violence.

In the specific context of India this rejection of secularism implies a revaluation on those traditions of India patriotism which during the colonial period could use creatively the encounters between politics and religion, as the lives of Ram Mohun Roy, Tagore, Tilak and Gandhi testify. (5) The Committee acknowledges the need to revive such ontonomic dialogues between politics and religion. In such dialogues, it also plans to include exchanges between religions and between cultures, cutting across the existing national boundaries and bypassing the standardised instruments of political exchange developed by the nation-states of South Asia.

The Committee is oriented to the future; it believes it can contribute to the welfare of the future generations by opening up the worlds of politics as well as of knowledge. To do so it proposes (1) to use the base built by the post-modern and nonmodern alternatives generated during the last few decades in the East as well as in the West and (2) to articulate the as-yet-inarticulate theories of resistance ventured by those who have been victims of the close links between modern knowledge and the global structures of power. The Committee takes seriously not only the victimhood of the subjects of these structures of power, but also the voices, the categories of thought, and the theories of oppression of these victims.

EDITORS' NOTES

- (1) Communalism is a relatively new concept in India which refers to political strife between the diverse communities.
- (2) The Unani and Ayurvedic systems are, respectively, the traditional Muslim and Hindu systems of medicine.
- (3) See note 1.
- (4) Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887-1920) was a Tamil genius in traditional Indian mathematics. See A. Nandy, *Alternative Sciences*, New Delhi : Allied Publishers, 1980, pp. 92-153.
- (5) Ram Mohun Roy (1772-1835), Bengali social reformer; Tilak (died in 1920), Marathi nationalist leader who tried to create a strong national feeling among the Indians by an appeal to their historic past; Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), Bengali educator, artist and poet; Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948).

INTERCULTURE

EDITORS

Jacques LANGLAIS and ROBERT VACHON

ADVISORY BOARD

ĐỖ QUÝ TOÀN, Merrill H. JACKSON, Raimundo PANIKKAR, John W. SPELLMAN, Mary STARK

ASSISTANT TO THE EDITOR

Viiivi JOEMETS

PRINTER

A. Roy, imprimerie, enr.

CIRCULATION MANAGER

Evelyn Lindhorst

SUBSCRIPTIONS (4 issues per year) - as of 1988

Canada: Individuals: 1 yr. \$12 Cdn. Foreign: Individuals: 1 yr. \$12 U.S.

Institutions: 1 yr. \$18 Cdn. Institutions: 1 yr. \$18 U.S.

3 yrs. \$50 Cdn. 3 yrs. \$50 U.S.

SEPARATE ISSUES: Canada: \$4 Cdn. Foreign: \$4 U.S. (postage included)

CUMULATIVE INDEX (1968-78): Canada: \$10 Cdn. Foreign: \$10 U.S.

CHEQUES payable to the Monchanin Cross-Cultural Center, 4917 St. Urbain St. Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H2T 2W1.

THE MONCHANIN CROSS-CULTURAL CENTER / LE CENTRE INTERCULTUREL MONCHANIN

is a center for education and research on cultures of the world and on intercultural relations. Founded in 1963 and incorporated (Quebec) in 1968.

SERVICES

- | | |
|--------------------|---|
| o Resource persons | o Consultations |
| o Library | o Counseling |
| o Publications | o Cross-cultural training for professionals |

ACTIVITIES

- | | |
|----------------------------|---|
| o Total immersion seminars | o Intercultural debates and discussions |
| o Symposia | o Colloquia |
| o Research | o Sensitization workshops |